

# SH25 The Philosophy of David Lewis

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Bricker, P. ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. *Philosophical Perspectives* **20**, 41–76 (2006).
  3.  
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David K. Lewis. Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. *The Journal of Philosophy* **65**, 113–126 (1968).
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Theodore Sider. The Ersatz Pluriverse. *The Journal of Philosophy* **99**, 279–315 (2002).
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