Block, Ned. n.d. ‘What Is Functionalism?’ http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/1981.whatisfunctionalism.pdf.
Block, Ned Joel. 1980. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: Vol.1. London: Methuen.
———. 1981. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: Vol.2. Vol. The language and thought series. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Braddon-Mitchell, David, and Frank Jackson. 2007. The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. 2nd ed. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing.
Child, William and Oxford University Press. 2004. Causality, Interpretation and the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780198236252/toc.html.
Evnine, Simon. 1991. Donald Davidson. Vol. Key contemporary thinkers. Oxford: Polity in association with Blackwell. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=177b3035-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
Frank Jackson. 1982. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 32 (127): 127–36. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077.
Guttenplan, Samuel D., ed. 1995. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Vol. 6. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781405164597.
Heil, John. 2004. Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=b4175c15-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
———. 2012. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. Vol. Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy. London: Routledge. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=12a34c28-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
J. A. Fodor. 1974. ‘Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)’. Synthese 28 (2): 97–115. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20114958.
J. J. C. Smart. 1959. ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’. The Philosophical Review 68 (2): 141–56. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182164.
Kim, Jaegwon. 2008. Physicalism, or Something near Enough. Vol. Princeton Monographs in Philosophy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=713591.
Kim, Jaegwon and Ebooks Corporation Limited. 2011. Philosophy of Mind. Third edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. http://GLA.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=665820.
Lowe, E. J. 2000. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950.
Lycan, William G. 1990. Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1999. Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Vol. Blackwell philosophy anthologies. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=2342360a-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
———. 2009. ‘Giving Dualism Its Due’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4): 551–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802340642.
Lycan, William G., and Jesse J. Prinz. 2008. Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
Mandik, Pete. 2013. This Is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Vol. This is philosophy. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9781118607480.
McLaughlin, Brian P., and Jonathan D. Cohen, eds. 2007. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Vol. 8. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9780470766323.
‘Meditations on First Philosophy by Rene Descartes’. n.d. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/descartes/1639/meditations.htm.
O’Connor, Timothy, David Robb, and John Heil. 2003. Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Vol. Routledge contemporary readings in philosophy. London: Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=240454.
Paul M. Churchland. 1981. ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’. The Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 67–90. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025900.
Rosenthal, David M. 1991a. The Nature of Mind. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=b5175c15-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
———. 1991b. The Nature of Mind. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=0acdeb1b-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
Searle, John R. 1980. ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (03). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756.
Sider, Theodore. 2003. ‘What’s So Bad About Overdetermination?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 719–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00321.x.
Smith, Peter, and O. R. Jones. 1986. The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=6144b32e-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099.
Thomas Nagel. 1974. ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ The Philosophical Review 83 (4): 435–50. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914.
