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Berk JB, DeMarzo PM. Corporate finance. Fourth edition, Global edition. Harlow, England: : Pearson Education Limited 2017. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=81fa8d84-e640-e911-80cd-005056af4099
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Gullifer L, Payne J. Corporate finance law: principles and policy. Second edition. Oxford: : Hart Publishing 2015. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=13a9e18b-e640-e911-80cd-005056af4099
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Maynard TH, Warren DM. Business planning: financing the start-up business and venture capital financing. Second Edition. New York: : Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2014. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=80fa8d84-e640-e911-80cd-005056af4099
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Coca-Cola to buy Costa Coffee chain from Whitbread for £3.9bn. Financial Timeshttps://www.ft.com/content/6782c756-ace3-11e8-89a1-e5de165fa619
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Coca-Cola salivates over Costa expansion opportunity. Financial Timeshttps://www.businesstelegraph.co.uk/coca-cola-salivates-over-costa-expansion-opportunity/
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Gullifer L, Payne J. Corporate finance law: principles and policy. Second edition. Oxford: : Hart Publishing 2015. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk/secure/link?id=13a9e18b-e640-e911-80cd-005056af4099
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Gilson RJ. Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing. Yale Law Journal 1984;94:239–314.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/ylr94&id=257
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Bernstein L. The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer. Oregon Law Review Published Online First: 1995.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/orglr74&id=249
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Private equity: a transactional analysis. Third edition. London: : Globe Law and Business 2014.
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George A. Akerlof. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1970;84:488–500.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879431
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Dierickx I, Koza M. Information asymmetries how not to ‘buy a lemon’ in negotiating mergers and acquisitions. European Management Journal 1991;9:229–34. doi:10.1016/0263-2373(91)90002-8
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Avoiding Lemons in M&A Deals - ProQuest. ;:15–7.http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/openview/2d36fe7d058be02f1e9c28b9b3ce6ffb/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=26142
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Pauly MV. The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment. The American Economic Review 1968;58:531–7.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1813785
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Arrow KJ. The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment. The American Economic Review 1968;58:537–9.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1813786
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Gilson RJ. Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience. Stanford Law Review 2003;55:1067–103.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229601
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Gilson RJ. Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2005;21:330–58. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewi012
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Kling LR, Simon E, Goldman M. Summary of Acquisitions Agreements. University of Miami Law Review Published Online First: 1997.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/umialr51&id=791
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Myers SC, Majluf NS. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 1984;13:187–221. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0
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Reuer JJ, Koza MP. Asymmetric Information and Joint Venture Performance: Theory and Evidence for Domestic and International Joint Ventures. Strategic Management Journal 2000;21:81–8.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3094120
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Stiglitz JE. The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2000;115:1441–78. doi:10.1162/003355300555015
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Arrow KJ. Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. The American Economic Review 1963;53:941–73.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1812044
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Wu C-W, Reuer JJ, Ragozzino R. Insights of Signaling Theory for Acquisitions Research. In: Cooper CL, Finkelstein S, eds. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions 12. Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2013. 173–91.https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/reader.action?docID=1341901&ppg=184
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Shen J-C, Reuer JJ. Adverse Selection in Acquisitions of Small Manufacturing Firms: A Comparison of Private and Public Targets. Small Business Economics 2005;24:393–407. doi:10.1007/s11187-005-5332-y
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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Third Edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan UK 2018. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5
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Olson M. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: : Harvard University Press 1971. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9780674041660
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The Tragedy of the Commons - YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bs2P0wRod8U
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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Third Edition. London: : Palgrave Macmillan UK 2018. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5
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What Is the Free Rider Problem? - YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uo51GDk8G1Q
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Cohen L. Holdouts and Free Riders. Journal of Legal Studies Published Online First: 1991.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/legstud20&id=355
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Kraakman RH. The anatomy of corporate law: a comparative and functional approach. Third edition. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2017. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.001.0001
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Elster J. Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1989.
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Becht M, Bolton P, Röell A. Corporate Governance and Control. In: Corporate Finance. Elsevier 2003. 1–109. doi:10.1016/S1574-0102(03)01005-7
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Mulherin JH. Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all. Public Choice 2005;124:179–204. doi:10.1007/s11127-005-4761-0
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Easterbrook FH, Fischel DR. Voting in Corporate Law. The Journal of Law & Economics 1983;26:395–427.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/725110
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Lloyd Cohen. Holdouts and Free Riders. The Journal of Legal Studies 1991;20:351–62.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/724443
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The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 1968;162:1243–8. doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
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Buchanan JM, Tullock G. The calculus of consent?: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Indianapolis: : Liberty Fund 1999. https://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3.html
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Myatt DP. collective action (new perspectives). In: Durlauf SN, Blume LE, eds. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Basingstoke: : Nature Publishing Group 2008. 881–6.http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5
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Smith CW. Agency Costs. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. London: : Palgrave Macmillan UK 2018. 99–101.http://link.springer.com/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_632
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Berle AA, Means GC. The modern corporation and private property. New York, N.Y.: : Macmillan Co 1933. https://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Index?index=beal/mcpp&collection=beal
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Eisenhardt KM. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of Management Review 1989;14:57–74.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/258191
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Kraakman RH. The anatomy of corporate law: a comparative and functional approach. Third edition. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2017. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.001.0001
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J. E. C. Munro. Principal and Agent (i). ;:10737–10737.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1543
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Joseph E. Stiglitz. Principal and Agent (ii). ;:10737–47.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1274
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Gilson RJ. Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience. Stanford Law Review 2003;55:1067–103.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229601
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Jensen MC, Meckling WH. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976;3:305–60. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
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Fama EF. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 1980;88:288–307.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1837292
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Fama EF, Jensen MC. Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of Law & Economics 1983;26:301–25.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/725104
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Amihud Y, Lev B. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics 1981;12. doi:10.2307/3003575
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Schwarcz SL. To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation. Journal of Corporation Law 2008;33:497–576.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/jcorl33&id=501
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Becht M, Polo A, Rossi S. Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? Review of Financial Studies 2016;29:3035–67. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw045
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Kosnik RD, Shapiro DL. Agency Conflicts between Investment Banks and Corporate Clients in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: Causes and Remedies. The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005) 1997;11:7–20.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4165368
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Mark V. Pauly. The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment. The American Economic Review 1968;58:531–7.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org./stable/1813785
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Gilson RJ, Schwartz A. Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2005;21:330–58.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3554959
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Akerlof GA. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1970;84:488–500.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879431
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Hurt C. Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering. Cardozo Law Review 2005;26:711–90.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/cdozo26&id=727
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Bolton P, Faure-Grimaud A. Satisficing Contracts. The Review of Economic Studies 2010;77:937–71.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40835853
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Rinker K A, Hill J G, Ashton K. MAC Clauses in the UK and US: Much Ado About Nothing? The Private Equity Report;13.https://privateequityreport.debevoise.com/the-private-equity-report-winter-2014-vol-14-number-1/the-private-equity-report-fall-2013-vol-13-number-4
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Coates, IV JC. Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications. SSRN Electronic Journal Published Online First: 2012. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2133343
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MacNeil IR. The Many Futures of Contracts. Southern California Law Review 1974;47:691–816.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/scal47&collection=journals&id=695
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Gilson RJ. Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing. Yale Law Journal 1984;94:239–314.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/ylr94&id=257
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Giuffra Jr. RJ. Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions. Yale Law Journal 1986;96:119–41.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/ylr96&id=137
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Katz AW. An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract. The University of Chicago Law Review 1999;66. doi:10.2307/1600386
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Mann RJ. Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions. Georgetown Law Journal 1999;87:2225–72.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/glj87&id=2245
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Gilson RJ, Kraakman RH. The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency. Virginia Law Review 1984;70. doi:10.2307/1073080
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Cather DA. A Gentle Introduction to Risk Aversion and Utility Theory. Risk Management and Insurance Review 2010;13:127–45. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6296.2009.01173.x
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Chorvat TR. Ambiguity and Income Taxation. Cardozo Law Review 2002;23:617–52.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/cdozo23&id=639
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Cheung SNS. Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements. The Journal of Law & Economics 1969;12:23–42.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/724978
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Machina MJ. Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 1987;1:121–54.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1942952
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Fuerst SB, San Filippo IV N, Ornstein SH. Earn-outs: Bridge the Gap, With Caution. Mergers & Acquisitions Law Report Published Online First: 16AD.https://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/8dab16c3-d1b5-46e1-8d07-0174915b002d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/966ec139-cc00-4a96-9f1e-07d9547e1bef/Earn%20Outs%20BNA%202009.pdf
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Hurt C. Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering. Cardozo Law Review 2005;26.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/cdozo26&i=727
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Mandelker G, Raviv A. Investment Banking: An Economic Analysis of Optimal Underwriting Contracts. The Journal of Finance 1977;32:683–94. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01980.x
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Lewkow VI, Koss SG. Mergers and Acquisitions: Another Look at Allocating Market Risk in Stock Acquisitions. Insights: The Corporate & Securities Law Advisor 2003;17.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=10613578&site=ehost-live
