Bibliography for SH25 The Philosophy of David Lewis

[1]
N. Salmon and D. Lewis, ‘On the Plurality of Worlds.’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 97, no. 2, Apr. 1988, doi: 10.2307/2185263.

[2]
P. Bricker, ‘ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 41–76, Dec. 2006, doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x.

[3]
David Lewis, ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 7, pp. 203–211, 1971 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024902

[4]
David K. Lewis, ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65, no. 5, pp. 113–126, 1968 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555

[5]
Theodore Sider, ‘The Ersatz Pluriverse’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 279–315, 2002 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655585

[6]
D. K. Lewis, On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

[7]
Gideon Rosen, ‘Modal Fictionalism’, Mind, vol. 99, no. 395, pp. 327–354, 1990 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102

[8]
S. A. Kripke, Naming and necessity, Rev. and enl. Ed., vol. Library of philosophy and logic. Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.

[9]
T. Sider, ‘Beyond the Humphrey Objection’, 2006 [Online]. Available: https://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf

[10]
D. Lewis, ‘Should a materialist believe in Qualia?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 140–144, Mar. 1995, doi: 10.1080/00048409512346451.

[11]
D. Lewis, ‘What Experience Teaches’. 1988 [Online]. Available: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/247198/Lewis-Experience.pdf?sequence=2

[12]
M. Tye, ‘Chapter 1 - Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument’, Consciousness, Color, and Content. [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://cognet.mit.edu/system/cogfiles/books/9780262285315/pdfs/9780262285315_chap1.pdf

[13]
D. Robinson, ‘Epiphenomenalism, laws & properties’, Philosophical Studies, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 1–34, Jan. 1993, doi: 10.1007/BF00989622.

[14]
Y. Cath, ‘The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-how’, Noûs, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 137–156, Feb. 2009, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01699.x.

[15]
D. K. Lewis and Oxford University Press, Philosophical papers: Volume 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/0195036468.001.0001

[16]
David Lewis, ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind, vol. 103, no. 412, pp. 473–490, 1994 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396

[17]
David Lewis, ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Noûs, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 455–476, 1979 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215339

[18]
Brian Weatherson, ‘Humean Supervenience’, in A companion to David Lewis, vol. Blackwell companions to philosophy, B. Loewer and J. Schaffer, Eds. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781118398593

[19]
D. Lewis, ‘Survival and Identity’, in Philosophical papers: Volume 1, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 55–72 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0005

[20]
S. Haslanger, ‘Humean supervenience and enduring things’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 339–359, Sep. 1994, doi: 10.1080/00048409412346141.

[21]
J. Schaffer, ‘Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity’, Analysis, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 299–309, Oct. 2004, doi: 10.1093/analys/64.4.299.

[22]
Adam Elga, ‘Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 68, no. 3, 2001 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3080955

[23]
D. K. Lewis, Convention: a philosophical study. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=876856

[24]
D. Lewis, ‘New work for a theory of universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 343–377, Dec. 1983, doi: 10.1080/00048408312341131.

[25]
D. Lewis, ‘Putnam’s paradox’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 221–236, Sep. 1984, doi: 10.1080/00048408412340013.

[26]
D. Lewis, ‘Radical interpretation’, Synthese, vol. 27, no. 3–4, pp. 331–344, 1974, doi: 10.1007/BF00484599.

[27]
D. Lewis, ‘Languages and Language’, in Philosophical Papers Volume I, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 163–188.

[28]
D. Lewis, ‘Meaning without use: Reply to Hawthorne’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 106–110, Mar. 1992, doi: 10.1080/00048408112340093.

[29]
S. D. Guttenplan, Ed., A companion to the philosophy of mind, vol. 6. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781405164597

[30]
J. Hawthorne, ‘A note on “languages and language”’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 116–118, Mar. 1990, doi: 10.1080/00048409012340233.

[31]
J. O’Leary-Hawthorne, ‘Meaning and evidence: A reply to Lewis’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 206–211, Jun. 1993, doi: 10.1080/00048409312345212.

[32]
S. D. Guttenplan, Ed., A companion to the philosophy of mind, vol. 6. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781405164597

[33]
H. P. Grice, ‘Meaning’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 377–388, 1957 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182440

[34]
David Lewis, ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no. 4, pp. 513–543, 1979 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184843

[35]
D. Lewis, ‘Should a materialist believe in Qualia?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 140–144, Mar. 1995, doi: 10.1080/00048409512346451.

[36]
M. Tye, ‘Chapter 1 - Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument’, Consciousness, Color, and Content. [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://cognet.mit.edu/system/cogfiles/books/9780262285315/pdfs/9780262285315_chap1.pdf

[37]
D. K. Lewis, On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

[38]
David K. Lewis, ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65, no. 5, pp. 113–126, 1968 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555

[39]
David Lewis, ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 7, pp. 203–211, 1971 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024902

[40]
Gideon Rosen, ‘Modal Fictionalism’, Mind, vol. 99, no. 395, pp. 327–354, 1990 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102

[41]
Theodore Sider, ‘The Ersatz Pluriverse’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 279–315, 2002 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655585

[42]
Stephan Leuenberger, ‘A New Problem of Descriptive Power’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 103, no. 3, pp. 145–162, 2006 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655756

[43]
J. Melia, Modality, vol. Central problems of philosophy. Chesham, Bucks: Acumen, 2003.

[44]
Willard V. Quine, ‘On What There Is’, The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 21–38, 1948 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117

[45]
P. Bricker, ‘ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 41–76, Dec. 2006, doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x.

[46]
Tony Roy, ‘In Defense of Linguistic Ersatzism’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 217–242, 1995 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320630

[47]
T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. W. Zimmerman, Contemporary debates in metaphysics, vol. Contemporary debates in philosophy. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2008 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=1204068

[48]
T. Sider, ‘Beyond the Humphrey Objection’, 2006 [Online]. Available: https://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf

[49]
D. K. Lewis, ‘Introduction to Philosophical papers: Volume 2’, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195036468.001.0001/acprof-9780195036466-miscMatter-6

[50]
David Lewis, ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind, vol. 103, no. 412, pp. 473–490, 1994 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396

[51]
D. Lewis, ‘Zimmerman and the spinning sphere’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 209–212, Jun. 1999, doi: 10.1080/00048409912348951.

[52]
D. W. Zimmerman, ‘One really big liquid sphere: Reply to Lewis’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 213–215, Jun. 1999, doi: 10.1080/00048409912348961.

[53]
D. Robinson, ‘Matter, motion, and Humean supervenience’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 394–409, Dec. 1989, doi: 10.1080/00048408912343921.

[54]
Katherine Hawley, ‘Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations’, Mind, vol. 108, no. 429, pp. 53–67, 1999 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2659902

[55]
D. W. Zimmerman, ‘Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 265–288, Jun. 1998, doi: 10.1080/00048409812348401.

[56]
Craig Callender, ‘Humean Supervenience and Rotating Homogeneous Matter’, Mind, vol. 110, no. 437, pp. 25–44, 2001 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2659829

[57]
D. K. Lewis, Philosophical papers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

[58]
D. K. Lewis, Papers in philosophical logic, vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[59]
D. K. Lewis, Papers in metaphysics and epistemology, vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[60]
D. K. Lewis, Papers in ethics and social philosophy, vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[61]
D. K. Lewis, Convention: a philosophical study. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=876856

[62]
D. K. Lewis, Counterfactuals, vol. Library of philosophy and logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973.

[63]
D. K. Lewis, On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

[64]
D. Lewis, Parts of classes. Basil Blackwell, 1990.

[65]
G. Preyer and F. Siebelt, Reality and Humean supervenience: essays on the philosophy of David Lewis, vol. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

[66]
F. Jackson and G. Priest, Lewisian themes: the philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.

[67]
B. Loewer and J. Schaffer, Eds., A companion to David Lewis, vol. Blackwell companions to philosophy. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781118398593

[68]
D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola, Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009.

[69]
W. Schwarz, David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse. Paderborn: Mentis, 2009.

[70]
D. P. Nolan, David Lewis, vol. Philosophy now. Chesham: Acumen, 2005.

[71]
U. Meixner, David Lewis, vol. NachGedacht-Moderne Klassiker. Paderborn: Mentis, 2006.

[72]
D. Lewis, ‘New work for a theory of universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 343–377, Dec. 1983, doi: 10.1080/00048408312341131.

[73]
John W. Carroll, ‘Nailed to Hume’s Cross?’, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. W. Zimmerman, Eds. Wiley, 2013 [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/reader.action?docID=1204068&ppg=107

[74]
David Lewis, ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind, vol. 103, no. 412, pp. 473–490, 1994 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396

[75]
Loewer, Barry, ‘Humean Supervenience’, Philosophical TopicsSouthwestern Journal of Philosophy (1970-1980);Philosophical Topics, vol. 24, no. 1 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1294810875/C2A7DAAE6A7E4EB6PQ/5?accountid=14540

[76]
T. Maudlin, ‘Why Be Humean?’, in The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 50–77 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001/acprof-9780199218219-chapter-3

[77]
P. Bricker, ‘ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 41–76, Dec. 2006, doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x.

Bibliography for SH25 The Philosophy of David Lewis BETA