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Salmon N, Lewis D. On the Plurality of Worlds. The Philosophical Review. 1988 Apr;97(2).
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Bricker P. ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. Philosophical Perspectives. 2006 Dec;20(1):41–76.
3.
David Lewis. Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 1971;68(7):203–11. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024902
4.
David K. Lewis. Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 1968;65(5):113–26. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555
5.
Theodore Sider. The Ersatz Pluriverse. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2002;99(6):279–315. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655585
6.
Lewis DK. On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1986.
7.
Gideon Rosen. Modal Fictionalism. Mind [Internet]. 1990;99(395):327–54. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102
8.
Kripke SA. Naming and necessity. Rev. and enl. ed. Vol. Library of philosophy and logic. Oxford: Blackwell; 1981.
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Sider T. Beyond the Humphrey Objection. 2006; Available from: https://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf
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Lewis D. Should a materialist believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1995 Mar;73(1):140–4.
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Lewis D. What Experience Teaches [Internet]. 1988. Available from: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/247198/Lewis-Experience.pdf?sequence=2
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Tye M. Chapter 1 - Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument [Internet]. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Available from: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://cognet.mit.edu/system/cogfiles/books/9780262285315/pdfs/9780262285315_chap1.pdf
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Robinson D. Epiphenomenalism, laws & properties. Philosophical Studies. 1993 Jan;69(1):1–34.
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Cath Y. The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-how. Noûs. 2009 Feb 4;43(1):137–56.
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Lewis DK, Oxford University Press. Philosophical papers: Volume 2 [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 1987. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/0195036468.001.0001
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David Lewis. Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind [Internet]. 1994;103(412):473–90. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396
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David Lewis. Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow. Noûs [Internet]. 1979;13(4):455–76. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215339
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Brian Weatherson. Humean Supervenience. In: Loewer B, Schaffer J, editors. A companion to David Lewis [Internet]. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell; 2015. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781118398593
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Lewis D. Survival and Identity. In: Philosophical papers: Volume 1 [Internet]. New York: Oxford University Press; 1983. p. 55–72. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0005
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Haslanger S. Humean supervenience and enduring things. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1994 Sep;72(3):339–59.
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Schaffer J. Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity. Analysis. 2004 Oct 1;64(4):299–309.
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Adam Elga. Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2001;68(3). Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3080955
23.
Lewis DK. Convention: a philosophical study [Internet]. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1969. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=876856
24.
Lewis D. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1983 Dec;61(4):343–77.
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Lewis D. Putnam’s paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1984 Sep;62(3):221–36.
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Lewis D. Radical interpretation. Synthese. 1974;27(3–4):331–44.
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Lewis D. Languages and Language. In: Philosophical Papers Volume I. Oxford University Press; 1983. p. 163–88.
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Lewis D. Meaning without use: Reply to Hawthorne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1992 Mar;70(1):106–10.
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Guttenplan SD, editor. A companion to the philosophy of mind [Internet]. Vol. 6. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 1995. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781405164597
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Hawthorne J. A note on ‘languages and language’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1990 Mar;68(1):116–8.
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O’Leary-Hawthorne J. Meaning and evidence: A reply to Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1993 Jun;71(2):206–11.
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Guttenplan SD, editor. A companion to the philosophy of mind [Internet]. Vol. 6. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 1995. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781405164597
33.
H. P. Grice. Meaning. The Philosophical Review [Internet]. 1957;66(3):377–88. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182440
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David Lewis. Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review [Internet]. 1979;88(4):513–43. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184843
35.
Lewis D. Should a materialist believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1995 Mar;73(1):140–4.
36.
Tye M. Chapter 1 - Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument [Internet]. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Available from: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://cognet.mit.edu/system/cogfiles/books/9780262285315/pdfs/9780262285315_chap1.pdf
37.
Lewis DK. On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1986.
38.
David K. Lewis. Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 1968;65(5):113–26. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555
39.
David Lewis. Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 1971;68(7):203–11. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024902
40.
Gideon Rosen. Modal Fictionalism. Mind [Internet]. 1990;99(395):327–54. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102
41.
Theodore Sider. The Ersatz Pluriverse. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2002;99(6):279–315. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655585
42.
Stephan Leuenberger. A New Problem of Descriptive Power. The Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2006;103(3):145–62. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655756
43.
Melia J. Modality. Vol. Central problems of philosophy. Chesham, Bucks: Acumen; 2003.
44.
Willard V. Quine. On What There Is. The Review of Metaphysics [Internet]. 1948;2(5):21–38. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117
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Bricker P. ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. Philosophical Perspectives. 2006 Dec;20(1):41–76.
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Tony Roy. In Defense of Linguistic Ersatzism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition [Internet]. 1995;80(3):217–42. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320630
47.
Sider T, Hawthorne J, Zimmerman DW. Contemporary debates in metaphysics [Internet]. Vol. Contemporary debates in philosophy. Malden, Mass: Blackwell; 2008. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=1204068
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Sider T. Beyond the Humphrey Objection. 2006; Available from: https://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf
49.
Lewis DK. Introduction to Philosophical papers: Volume 2. In New York: Oxford University Press; 1986. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195036468.001.0001/acprof-9780195036466-miscMatter-6
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David Lewis. Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind [Internet]. 1994;103(412):473–90. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396
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Lewis D. Zimmerman and the spinning sphere. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1999 Jun;77(2):209–12.
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Zimmerman DW. One really big liquid sphere: Reply to Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1999 Jun;77(2):213–5.
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Robinson D. Matter, motion, and Humean supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1989 Dec;67(4):394–409.
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Katherine Hawley. Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations. Mind [Internet]. 1999;108(429):53–67. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2659902
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Zimmerman DW. Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1998 Jun;76(2):265–88.
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Craig Callender. Humean Supervenience and Rotating Homogeneous Matter. Mind [Internet]. 2001;110(437):25–44. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2659829
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Lewis DK. Philosophical papers. New York: Oxford University Press; 1983.
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Lewis DK. Papers in philosophical logic. Vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998.
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Lewis DK. Papers in metaphysics and epistemology. Vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1999.
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Lewis DK. Papers in ethics and social philosophy. Vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000.
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Lewis DK. Convention: a philosophical study [Internet]. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; 1969. Available from: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=876856
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Lewis DK. Counterfactuals. Vol. Library of philosophy and logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1973.
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Lewis DK. On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1986.
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Lewis D. Parts of classes. Basil Blackwell; 1990.
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Preyer G, Siebelt F. Reality and Humean supervenience: essays on the philosophy of David Lewis. Vol. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; 2001.
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Jackson F, Priest G. Lewisian themes: the philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2004.
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Loewer B, Schaffer J, editors. A companion to David Lewis [Internet]. Vol. Blackwell companions to philosophy. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell; 2015. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781118398593
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Braddon-Mitchell D, Nola R. Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; 2009.
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Schwarz W. David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse. Paderborn: Mentis; 2009.
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Nolan DP. David Lewis. Vol. Philosophy now. Chesham: Acumen; 2005.
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Meixner U. David Lewis. Vol. NachGedacht-Moderne Klassiker. Paderborn: Mentis; 2006.
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Lewis D. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1983 Dec;61(4):343–77.
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John W. Carroll. Nailed to Hume’s Cross? In: Sider T, Hawthorne J, Zimmerman DW, editors. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics [Internet]. Wiley; 2013. Available from: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/reader.action?docID=1204068&ppg=107
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David Lewis. Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind [Internet]. 1994;103(412):473–90. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254396
75.
Loewer, Barry. Humean Supervenience. Philosophical TopicsSouthwestern Journal of Philosophy (1970-1980);Philosophical Topics [Internet]. 24(1). Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1294810875/C2A7DAAE6A7E4EB6PQ/5?accountid=14540
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Maudlin T. Why Be Humean? In: The Metaphysics Within Physics [Internet]. Oxford University Press; 2007. p. 50–77. Available from: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001/acprof-9780199218219-chapter-3
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Bricker P. ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. Philosophical Perspectives. 2006 Dec;20(1):41–76.