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David Lewis. Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review. 1979;88:513–43.
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Lewis D. Zimmerman and the spinning sphere. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1999;77:209–12. doi: 10.1080/00048409912348951
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