1.
Salmon, N., Lewis, D.: On the Plurality of Worlds. The Philosophical Review. 97, (1988). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185263.
2.
Bricker, P.: ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. Philosophical Perspectives. 20, 41–76 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x.
3.
David Lewis: Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. The Journal of Philosophy. 68, 203–211 (1971).
4.
David K. Lewis: Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy. 65, 113–126 (1968).
5.
Theodore Sider: The Ersatz Pluriverse. The Journal of Philosophy. 99, 279–315 (2002).
6.
Lewis, D.K.: On the plurality of worlds. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
7.
Gideon Rosen: Modal Fictionalism. Mind. 99, 327–354 (1990).
8.
Kripke, S.A.: Naming and necessity. Blackwell, Oxford (1981).
9.
Sider, T.: Beyond the Humphrey Objection. (2006).
10.
Lewis, D.: Should a materialist believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 73, 140–144 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409512346451.
11.
Lewis, D.: What Experience Teaches, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/247198/Lewis-Experience.pdf?sequence=2, (1988).
12.
Tye, M.: Chapter 1 - Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument, http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://cognet.mit.edu/system/cogfiles/books/9780262285315/pdfs/9780262285315_chap1.pdf.
13.
Robinson, D.: Epiphenomenalism, laws & properties. Philosophical Studies. 69, 1–34 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989622.
14.
Cath, Y.: The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-how. Noûs. 43, 137–156 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01699.x.
15.
Lewis, D.K., Oxford University Press: Philosophical papers: Volume 2. Oxford University Press, New York (1987).
16.
David Lewis: Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind. 103, 473–490 (1994).
17.
David Lewis: Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow. Noûs. 13, 455–476 (1979).
18.
Brian Weatherson: Humean Supervenience. In: Loewer, B. and Schaffer, J. (eds.) A companion to David Lewis. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex (2015).
19.
Lewis, D.: Survival and Identity. In: Philosophical papers: Volume 1. pp. 55–72. Oxford University Press, New York (1983).
20.
Haslanger, S.: Humean supervenience and enduring things. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 72, 339–359 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409412346141.
21.
Schaffer, J.: Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity. Analysis. 64, 299–309 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.4.299.
22.
Adam Elga: Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. Philosophy of Science. 68, (2001).
23.
Lewis, D.K.: Convention: a philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass (1969).
24.
Lewis, D.: New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 61, 343–377 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408312341131.
25.
Lewis, D.: Putnam’s paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 62, 221–236 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408412340013.
26.
Lewis, D.: Radical interpretation. Synthese. 27, 331–344 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00484599.
27.
Lewis, D.: Languages and Language. In: Philosophical Papers Volume I. pp. 163–188. Oxford University Press (1983). https://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0011.
28.
Lewis, D.: Meaning without use: Reply to Hawthorne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 70, 106–110 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408112340093.
29.
Guttenplan, S.D. ed: A companion to the philosophy of mind. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford (1995).
30.
Hawthorne, J.: A note on ‘languages and language’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 68, 116–118 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409012340233.
31.
O’Leary-Hawthorne, J.: Meaning and evidence: A reply to Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 71, 206–211 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409312345212.
32.
Guttenplan, S.D. ed: A companion to the philosophy of mind. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford (1995).
33.
H. P. Grice: Meaning. The Philosophical Review. 66, 377–388 (1957).
34.
David Lewis: Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review. 88, 513–543 (1979).
35.
Lewis, D.: Should a materialist believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 73, 140–144 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409512346451.
36.
Tye, M.: Chapter 1 - Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument, http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://cognet.mit.edu/system/cogfiles/books/9780262285315/pdfs/9780262285315_chap1.pdf.
37.
Lewis, D.K.: On the plurality of worlds. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
38.
David K. Lewis: Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy. 65, 113–126 (1968).
39.
David Lewis: Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. The Journal of Philosophy. 68, 203–211 (1971).
40.
Gideon Rosen: Modal Fictionalism. Mind. 99, 327–354 (1990).
41.
Theodore Sider: The Ersatz Pluriverse. The Journal of Philosophy. 99, 279–315 (2002).
42.
Stephan Leuenberger: A New Problem of Descriptive Power. The Journal of Philosophy. 103, 145–162 (2006).
43.
Melia, J.: Modality. Acumen, Chesham, Bucks (2003).
44.
Willard V. Quine: On What There Is. The Review of Metaphysics. 2, 21–38 (1948).
45.
Bricker, P.: ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. Philosophical Perspectives. 20, 41–76 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x.
46.
Tony Roy: In Defense of Linguistic Ersatzism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 80, 217–242 (1995).
47.
Sider, T., Hawthorne, J., Zimmerman, D.W.: Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Blackwell, Malden, Mass (2008).
48.
Sider, T.: Beyond the Humphrey Objection. (2006).
49.
Lewis, D.K.: Introduction to Philosophical papers: Volume 2. Presented at the (1986).
50.
David Lewis: Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind. 103, 473–490 (1994).
51.
Lewis, D.: Zimmerman and the spinning sphere. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 77, 209–212 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409912348951.
52.
Zimmerman, D.W.: One really big liquid sphere: Reply to Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 77, 213–215 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409912348961.
53.
Robinson, D.: Matter, motion, and Humean supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 67, 394–409 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408912343921.
54.
Katherine Hawley: Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations. Mind. 108, 53–67 (1999).
55.
Zimmerman, D.W.: Temporal parts and supervenient causation: The incompatibility of two Humean doctrines. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 76, 265–288 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409812348401.
56.
Craig Callender: Humean Supervenience and Rotating Homogeneous Matter. Mind. 110, 25–44 (2001).
57.
Lewis, D.K.: Philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, New York (1983).
58.
Lewis, D.K.: Papers in philosophical logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998).
59.
Lewis, D.K.: Papers in metaphysics and epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1999).
60.
Lewis, D.K.: Papers in ethics and social philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000).
61.
Lewis, D.K.: Convention: a philosophical study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass (1969).
62.
Lewis, D.K.: Counterfactuals. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1973).
63.
Lewis, D.K.: On the plurality of worlds. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
64.
Lewis, D.: Parts of classes. Basil Blackwell (1990).
65.
Preyer, G., Siebelt, F.: Reality and Humean supervenience: essays on the philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Md (2001).
66.
Jackson, F., Priest, G.: Lewisian themes: the philosophy of David K. Lewis. Clarendon Press, Oxford (2004).
67.
Loewer, B., Schaffer, J. eds: A companion to David Lewis. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex (2015).
68.
Braddon-Mitchell, D., Nola, R.: Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass (2009).
69.
Schwarz, W.: David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse. Mentis, Paderborn (2009).
70.
Nolan, D.P.: David Lewis. Acumen, Chesham (2005).
71.
Meixner, U.: David Lewis. Mentis, Paderborn (2006).
72.
Lewis, D.: New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 61, 343–377 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408312341131.
73.
John W. Carroll: Nailed to Hume’s Cross? In: Sider, T., Hawthorne, J., and Zimmerman, D.W. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Wiley (2013).
74.
David Lewis: Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind. 103, 473–490 (1994).
75.
Loewer, Barry: Humean Supervenience. Philosophical TopicsSouthwestern Journal of Philosophy (1970-1980);Philosophical Topics. 24,.
76.
Maudlin, T.: Why Be Humean? In: The Metaphysics Within Physics. pp. 50–77. Oxford University Press (2007). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.003.0003.
77.
Bricker, P.: ABSOLUTE ACTUALITY AND THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. Philosophical Perspectives. 20, 41–76 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x.