A. M. Quinton. (1955). The Problem of Perception. Mind, 64(253), 28–51. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251042
Austin, J. L., & Warnock, G. J. (1962). Sense and sensibilia. Clarendon.
Ayer, A. J. (1940). The foundations of empirical knowledge. Macmillan and Co.
Bermudez, J. L. (2000). Naturalized Sense Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(2). https://doi.org/10.2307/2653655
Block, N. (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues, 7. https://doi.org/10.2307/1522889
Block, N. J., Flanagan, O. J., & Güzeldere, G. (1997). The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. MIT Press.
Block, N., & Tye, M. (1998). Is Experiencing Just Representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58(3). https://doi.org/10.2307/2653766
Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review, 110(2). https://doi.org/10.2307/2693675
Child, W. (1992). Vision and Experience: The Causal theory and the Disjunctive Conception. The Philosophical Quarterly, 42(168). https://doi.org/10.2307/2219682
Craig, E. & Routledge (Firm). (2003). Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy online. Routledge. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://rep.routledge.com
Crane, T., & French, C. (n.d.). The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
Dancy, J. (1985). An introduction to contemporary epistemology. Blackwell Publishing.
Dancy, J. (1988). Perceptual knowledge: Vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=d71d563c-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099
Dretske, F. (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues, 13(1), 67–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/1533-6077.00005
Dretske, F. I. (1997). Naturalizing the mind: Vol. Jean Nicod lectures. The MIT Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/naturalizing-mind
Fish, W. & Oxford University Press. (2009). Perception, hallucination, and illusion: Vol. Philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001
Gangopadhyay, N., Madary, M., Spicer, F., & Oxford University Press. (2010). Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. Oxford University Press. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.001.0001
Gendler, T., & Hawthorne, J. (2010). Perceptual experience. Clarendon. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001
Haddock, A., Macpherson, F., & Oxford University Press. (2008a). Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
Haddock, A., Macpherson, F., & Oxford University Press. (2008b). Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives, 4. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214186
Hawley, K., & Macpherson, F. (2011). The admissible contents of experience. Wiley-Blackwell. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9781444343892
Huemer, M. (n.d.). Sense-Data. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/
Jackson, F. (1977). Perception: a representative theory. Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, F. (1993). Perception: a representative theory: Vol. Modern revivals in philosophy. Gregg Revivals.
Kind, A. (2003). What’s so Transparent about Transparency? Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 115(3), 225–244. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321404
Lewis, D. (1980). Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58(3), 239–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408012341251
Logue, H. (2012). Why Naïve Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 112(2pt2), 211–237. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x
Lowe, E. J. (1996). Subjects of experience: Vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (2000a). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
Lowe, E. J. (2000b). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
Lowe, E. J. (2000c). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
Lycan, W. (n.d.). Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/consciousness-representational/
Lycan, W. G. (1996). Consciousness and experience. MIT Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=48459&site=ehost-live
Macpherson, F. (2003). Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84(1), 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00162
Macpherson, F. (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(1), 127–152. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040782
Martin, M. G. F. (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 120(1), 37–89. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321508
Millar, A. (1996). The Idea of Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 75–90. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545229
Moore, G. E. (1953). Some main problems of philosophy: Vol. Muirhead library of philosophy. Allen & Unwin.
Noë, A. (2003). Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled. Analysis, 63(2), 93–100. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329214
Nudds, M. (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naive Realism and its Opponents. Analysis, 69(2), 334–346. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp039
O’Callaghan, C. (2012). Perception. In K. Frankish & W. Ramsey (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (pp. 73–91). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139033916.007
Pitcher, G. (1971). A theory of perception. Princeton University Press.
Prinz, J. (2006). Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. Psyche, 12(1). http://journalpsyche.org/files/0xaae8.pdf
Raffman, D. (n.d.). Similarity Spaces. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-030
Rescorla, M. (n.d.). Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-010
Robinson, H. (2001). Perception: Vol. The problems of philosophy. Routledge. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9780203164358
Russell, B. (2009). The Problems of Philosophy. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Hutchinson.
Schilpp, P. A. (1942). The philosophy of G.E. Moore: Vol. The library of living philosophers. Northwestern University.
Seager, W. & MyiLibrary. (1999). Theories of consciousness: an introduction and assessment: Vol. Philosophical issues in science. Routledge. http://lib.myilibrary.com/browse/open.asp?id=19487&entityid=https://idp.gla.ac.uk/shibboleth
Shapiro, L. (2007). The Embodied Cognition Research Programme. Philosophy Compass, 2(2), 338–346. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00064.x
Siegel, S. (2006). Which Properties are Represented in Perception? In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual Experience (pp. 481–503). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0015
Smith, A. D. (2002). The problem of perception. Harvard University Press.
Snowdon, P. (1981). Perception, Vision and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81, 175–192. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544972
Swartz, R. J. (1965). Perceiving, sensing and knowing: a book of readings from twentieth-century sources in the philosophy of perception. Doubleday.
Tye, M. (1982). A Causal Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42(3). https://doi.org/10.2307/2107488
Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness: a representational theory of the phenomenal mind: Vol. Representation and mind. The MIT Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/ten-problems-of-consciousness
Tye, M. (1998). Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism. Philosophical Perspectives, 12, 459–477. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676158
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content: Vol. Representation and mind. The MIT Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/consciousness-color-and-content
Warnock, G. J. (1967). The Philosophy of perception: Vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. (2013). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 181–204. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12000477
Wright, E. L. (2008). The case for qualia. MIT Press. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001
Wright, W. (2015). Nonconceptual Content. In M. Matthen (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of perception (First edition). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.003