1.
Crane T, French C. The Problem of Perception. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
2.
O’Callaghan C. Perception. In: Frankish K, Ramsey W, eds. The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press; 2012:73-91. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139033916.007
3.
Lowe EJ. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press; 2000. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
4.
Lowe EJ. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press; 2000. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
5.
Huemer M. Sense-Data. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/
6.
Craig E, Routledge (Firm). Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy online. Published 2003. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://rep.routledge.com
7.
Russell B. The Problems of Philosophy.; 2009. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm
8.
Moore GE. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. Vol Muirhead library of philosophy. Allen & Unwin; 1953.
9.
Ayer AJ. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan and Co; 1940.
10.
Jackson F. Perception: A Representative Theory. Vol Modern revivals in philosophy. Gregg Revivals; 1993.
11.
Robinson H. Perception. Vol The problems of philosophy. Routledge; 2001. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9780203164358
12.
Bermudez JL. Naturalized Sense Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2000;61(2). doi:10.2307/2653655
13.
Ryle G. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson; 1949.
14.
Austin JL, Warnock GJ. Sense and Sensibilia. Clarendon; 1962.
15.
Pitcher G. A Theory of Perception. Princeton University Press; 1971.
16.
A. M. Quinton. The Problem of Perception. Mind. 1955;64(253):28-51. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251042
17.
Swartz RJ. Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing: A Book of Readings from Twentieth-Century Sources in the Philosophy of Perception. Doubleday; 1965.
18.
Schilpp PA. The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. Vol The library of living philosophers. Northwestern University; 1942.
19.
Dancy J. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell Publishing; 1985.
20.
Jackson F. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press; 1977.
21.
Lowe EJ. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press; 2000. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
22.
Warnock GJ. The Philosophy of Perception. Vol Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press; 1967.
23.
Lewis D. Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1980;58(3):239-249. doi:10.1080/00048408012341251
24.
Lowe EJ. Subjects of Experience. Vol Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge University Press; 1996.
25.
Tye M. A Causal Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1982;42(3). doi:10.2307/2107488
26.
Noë A. Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled. Analysis. 2003;63(2):93-100. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329214
27.
Lycan W. Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/consciousness-representational/
28.
Seager W, MyiLibrary. Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Vol Philosophical issues in science. Routledge; 1999. http://lib.myilibrary.com/browse/open.asp?id=19487&entityid=https://idp.gla.ac.uk/shibboleth
29.
Dretske F. Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues. 2003;13(1):67-82. doi:10.1111/1533-6077.00005
30.
Harman G. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives. 1990;4. doi:10.2307/2214186
31.
Tye M. Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism. Philosophical Perspectives. 1998;12:459-477. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676158
32.
Dretske FI. Naturalizing the Mind. Vol Jean Nicod lectures. The MIT Press; 1997. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/naturalizing-mind
33.
Lycan WG. Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press; 1996. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=48459&site=ehost-live
34.
Tye M. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Vol Representation and mind. The MIT Press; 1995. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/ten-problems-of-consciousness
35.
Tye M. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Vol Representation and mind. The MIT Press; 2000. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/consciousness-color-and-content
36.
Byrne A. Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review. 2001;110(2). doi:10.2307/2693675
37.
Block NJ, Flanagan OJ, Güzeldere G. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press; 1997.
38.
Block N. Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues. 1996;7. doi:10.2307/1522889
39.
Block N, Tye M. Is Experiencing Just Representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1998;58(3). doi:10.2307/2653766
40.
Kind A. What’s so Transparent about Transparency? Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 2003;115(3):225-244. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321404
41.
Macpherson F. Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2005;70(1):127-152. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040782
42.
Macpherson F. Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2003;84(1):43-66. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00162
43.
Wright EL. The Case for Qualia. MIT Press; 2008. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001
44.
Wright W. Nonconceptual Content. In: Matthen M, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. First edition. Oxford University Press; 2015. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.003
45.
Smith AD. The Problem of Perception. Harvard University Press; 2002.
46.
Siegel S. Which Properties are Represented in Perception? In: Gendler TS, Hawthorne J, eds. Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press; 2006:481-503. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0015
47.
Hawley K, Macpherson F. The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell; 2011. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9781444343892
48.
Haddock A, Macpherson F, Oxford University Press. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press; 2008. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
49.
Dancy J. Perceptual Knowledge. Vol Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press; 1988. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=d71d563c-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099
50.
Snowdon P. Perception, Vision and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1981;81:175-192. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544972
51.
Martin MGF. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 2004;120(1):37-89. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321508
52.
Fish W, Oxford University Press. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Vol Philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press; 2009. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001
53.
Child W. Vision and Experience: The Causal theory and the Disjunctive Conception. The Philosophical Quarterly. 1992;42(168). doi:10.2307/2219682
54.
Millar A. The Idea of Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1996;96:75-90. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545229
55.
Gendler T, Hawthorne J. Perceptual Experience. Clarendon; 2010. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001
56.
Logue H. Why Naïve Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). 2012;112(2pt2):211-237. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x
57.
Nudds M. Recent Work in Perception: Naive Realism and its Opponents. Analysis. 2009;69(2):334-346. doi:10.1093/analys/anp039
58.
Haddock A, Macpherson F, Oxford University Press. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press; 2008. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
59.
Shapiro L. The Embodied Cognition Research Programme. Philosophy Compass. 2007;2(2):338-346. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00064.x
60.
Gangopadhyay N, Madary M, Spicer F, Oxford University Press. Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press; 2010. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.001.0001
61.
Prinz J. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. Psyche. 2006;12(1). http://journalpsyche.org/files/0xaae8.pdf
62.
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2013;36(03):181-204. doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000477
63.
Raffman D. Similarity Spaces. In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-030
64.
Rescorla M. Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-010