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Crane T, French C. The Problem of Perception. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophyhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
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O’Callaghan C. Perception. In: Frankish K, Ramsey W, eds. The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2012. 73–91. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139033916.007
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Lowe EJ. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2000. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
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Lowe EJ. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2000. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
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Huemer M. Sense-Data. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophyhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/
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Craig E, Routledge (Firm). Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy online. 2003.http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://rep.routledge.com
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Russell B. The Problems of Philosophy. 2009. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm
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Moore GE. Some main problems of philosophy. London: : Allen & Unwin 1953.
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Ayer AJ. The foundations of empirical knowledge. London: : Macmillan and Co 1940.
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Jackson F. Perception: a representative theory. Aldershot: : Gregg Revivals 1993.
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Robinson H. Perception. London: : Routledge 2001. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9780203164358
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Bermudez JL. Naturalized Sense Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2000;61. doi:10.2307/2653655
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Ryle G. The concept of mind. London: : Hutchinson 1949.
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Austin JL, Warnock GJ. Sense and sensibilia. Oxford: : Clarendon 1962.
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Pitcher G. A theory of perception. Princeton, N.J.: : Princeton University Press 1971.
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A. M. Quinton. The Problem of Perception. Mind 1955;64:28–51.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251042
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Swartz RJ. Perceiving, sensing and knowing: a book of readings from twentieth-century sources in the philosophy of perception. New York: : Doubleday 1965.
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Schilpp PA. The philosophy of G.E. Moore. Evanston: : Northwestern University 1942.
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Dancy J. An introduction to contemporary epistemology. Oxford: : Blackwell Publishing 1985.
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Jackson F. Perception: a representative theory. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1977.
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Lowe EJ. An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2000. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
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Warnock GJ. The Philosophy of perception. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1967.
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Lewis D. Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1980;58:239–49. doi:10.1080/00048408012341251
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Lowe EJ. Subjects of experience. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1996.
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Tye M. A Causal Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1982;42. doi:10.2307/2107488
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Noë A. Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled. Analysis 2003;63:93–100.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329214
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Lycan W. Representational Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archivehttps://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/consciousness-representational/
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Seager W, MyiLibrary. Theories of consciousness: an introduction and assessment. London: : Routledge 1999. http://lib.myilibrary.com/browse/open.asp?id=19487&entityid=https://idp.gla.ac.uk/shibboleth
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Dretske F. Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 2003;13:67–82. doi:10.1111/1533-6077.00005
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Harman G. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 1990;4. doi:10.2307/2214186
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Tye M. Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism. Philosophical Perspectives 1998;12:459–77.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676158
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Dretske FI. Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: : The MIT Press 1997. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/naturalizing-mind
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Lycan WG. Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, Mass: : MIT Press 1996. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=48459&site=ehost-live
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Tye M. Ten problems of consciousness: a representational theory of the phenomenal mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: : The MIT Press 1995. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/ten-problems-of-consciousness
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Tye M. Consciousness, color, and content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: : The MIT Press 2000. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/consciousness-color-and-content
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Byrne A. Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review 2001;110. doi:10.2307/2693675
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Block NJ, Flanagan OJ, Güzeldere G. The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. Cambridge, Mass: : MIT Press 1997.
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Block N. Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 1996;7. doi:10.2307/1522889
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Block N, Tye M. Is Experiencing Just Representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1998;58. doi:10.2307/2653766
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Kind A. What’s so Transparent about Transparency? Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 2003;115:225–44.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321404
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Macpherson F. Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2005;70:127–52.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040782
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Macpherson F. Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2003;84:43–66. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00162
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Wright EL. The case for qualia. Cambridge, Mass: : MIT Press 2008. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001
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Wright W. Nonconceptual Content. In: Matthen M, ed. The Oxford handbook of philosophy of perception. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2015. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.003
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Smith AD. The problem of perception. Cambridge, Mass: : Harvard University Press 2002.
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Siegel S. Which Properties are Represented in Perception? In: Gendler TS, Hawthorne J, eds. Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 2006. 481–503. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0015
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Hawley K, Macpherson F. The admissible contents of experience. Chichester: : Wiley-Blackwell 2011. https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9781444343892
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Haddock A, Macpherson F, Oxford University Press. Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2008. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
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Dancy J. Perceptual knowledge. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1988. https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=d71d563c-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099
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Snowdon P. Perception, Vision and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1981;81:175–92.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544972
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Martin MGF. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 2004;120:37–89.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321508
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Fish W, Oxford University Press. Perception, hallucination, and illusion. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2009. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001
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Child W. Vision and Experience: The Causal theory and the Disjunctive Conception. The Philosophical Quarterly 1992;42. doi:10.2307/2219682
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Millar A. The Idea of Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1996;96:75–90.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545229
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Gendler T, Hawthorne J. Perceptual experience. Oxford: : Clarendon 2010. https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001
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Logue H. Why Naïve Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 2012;112:211–37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x
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Nudds M. Recent Work in Perception: Naive Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 2009;69:334–46. doi:10.1093/analys/anp039
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Haddock A, Macpherson F, Oxford University Press. Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2008. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
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Shapiro L. The Embodied Cognition Research Programme. Philosophy Compass 2007;2:338–46. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00064.x
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Gangopadhyay N, Madary M, Spicer F, et al. Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2010. http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.001.0001
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Prinz J. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. Psyche 2006;12.http://journalpsyche.org/files/0xaae8.pdf
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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2013;36:181–204. doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000477
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Raffman D. Similarity Spaces. In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-030
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Rescorla M. Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-010