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E. J. Lowe, An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
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E. J. Lowe, An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=201950
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M. Huemer, ‘Sense-Data’, Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy [Online]. Available: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/
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E. Craig and Routledge (Firm), ‘Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy online’, 2003. [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://rep.routledge.com
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B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy. 2009 [Online]. Available: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm
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G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, vol. Muirhead library of philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1953.
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A. M. Quinton, ‘The Problem of Perception’, Mind, vol. 64, no. 253, pp. 28–51, 1955 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251042
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R. J. Swartz, Perceiving, sensing and knowing: a book of readings from twentieth-century sources in the philosophy of perception. New York: Doubleday, 1965.
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G. J. Warnock, The Philosophy of perception, vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
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A. Noë, ‘Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled’, Analysis, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 93–100, 2003 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329214
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W. Lycan, ‘Representational Theories of Consciousness’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive [Online]. Available: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/consciousness-representational/
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G. Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4, 1990, doi: 10.2307/2214186. [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214186
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M. Tye, ‘Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 12, pp. 459–477, 1998 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676158
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F. I. Dretske, Naturalizing the mind, vol. Jean Nicod lectures. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/naturalizing-mind
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W. G. Lycan, Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=48459&site=ehost-live
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M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness: a representational theory of the phenomenal mind, vol. Representation and mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/ten-problems-of-consciousness
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M. Tye, Consciousness, color, and content, vol. Representation and mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://cognet.mit.edu/book/consciousness-color-and-content
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A. Byrne, ‘Intentionalism Defended’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 110, no. 2, Apr. 2001, doi: 10.2307/2693675. [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2693675
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N. J. Block, O. J. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997.
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F. Macpherson, ‘Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 127–152, 2005 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040782
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F. Macpherson, ‘Novel Colours and the Content of Experience’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 43–66, Mar. 2003, doi: 10.1111/1468-0114.00162. [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0114.00162/abstract
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E. L. Wright, The case for qualia. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2008 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001
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W. Wright, ‘Nonconceptual Content’, in The Oxford handbook of philosophy of perception, First edition., M. Matthen, Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001
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A. D. Smith, The problem of perception. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002.
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S. Siegel, ‘Which Properties are Represented in Perception?’, in Perceptual Experience, T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Eds. Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 481–503 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001/acprof-9780199289769-chapter-15
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K. Hawley and F. Macpherson, The admissible contents of experience. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011 [Online]. Available: https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=GlasgowUni&isbn=9781444343892
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A. Haddock, F. Macpherson, and Oxford University Press, Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
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J. Dancy, Perceptual knowledge, vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988 [Online]. Available: https://contentstore.cla.co.uk//secure/link?id=d71d563c-ed40-e911-80cd-005056af4099
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P. Snowdon, ‘Perception, Vision and Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 81, pp. 175–192, 1981 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544972
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M. G. F. Martin, ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, vol. 120, no. 1, pp. 37–89, 2004 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321508
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W. Fish and Oxford University Press, Perception, hallucination, and illusion, vol. Philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001
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W. Child, ‘Vision and Experience: The Causal theory and the Disjunctive Conception’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 168, Jul. 1992, doi: 10.2307/2219682.
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A. Millar, ‘The Idea of Experience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 96, pp. 75–90, 1996 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545229
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T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Perceptual experience. Oxford: Clarendon, 2010 [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001
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H. Logue, ‘Why Naïve Realism?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), vol. 112, no. 2pt2, pp. 211–237, Jul. 2012, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x.
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M. Nudds, ‘Recent Work in Perception: Naive Realism and its Opponents’, Analysis, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 334–346, Apr. 2009, doi: 10.1093/analys/anp039.
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A. Haddock, F. Macpherson, and Oxford University Press, Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
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L. Shapiro, ‘The Embodied Cognition Research Programme’, Philosophy Compass, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 338–346, Mar. 2007, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00064.x.
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N. Gangopadhyay, M. Madary, F. Spicer, and Oxford University Press, Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 [Online]. Available: http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.001.0001
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J. Prinz, ‘Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception’, Psyche, vol. 12, no. 1, 2006 [Online]. Available: http://journalpsyche.org/files/0xaae8.pdf
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‘Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 36, no. 03, pp. 181–204, Jun. 2013, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12000477.
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D. Raffman, ‘Similarity Spaces’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-030
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M. Rescorla, ‘Bayesian Perceptual Psychology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, [Online]. Available: https://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199600472-e-010
